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Abstract: Increasingly, empirical evidence refutes many of the theoretical pillars of mainstream
economics. These theories have persisted despite the fact that they support unsustainable and
undesirable environmental, social, and economic outcomes. Continuing to embrace them puts at
risk the possibility of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and overcoming other global
challenges. We discuss a selection of paradoxes and delusions surrounding mainstream economic
theories related to: (1) efficiency and resource use, (2) wealth and wellbeing, (3) economic growth,
and (4) the distribution of wealth within and between rich and poor nations. We describe a wellbeing
economy as an alternative for guiding policy development. In 2018, a network of Wellbeing
Economy Governments (WEGo), (supported by, but distinct from, the larger Wellbeing Economy
Alliance—WEAll) promoting new forms of governance that diverge from the ones on which the
G7 and G20 are based, has been launched and is now a living project. Members of WEGo aim
at advancing the three key principles of a wellbeing economy: Live within planetary ecological
boundaries, ensure equitable distribution of wealth and opportunity, and efficiently allocate resources
(including environmental and social public goods), bringing wellbeing to the heart of policymaking,
and in particular economic policymaking. This network has potential to fundamentally re-shape
current global leadership still anchored to old economic paradigms that give primacy to economic
growth over environmental and social wealth and wellbeing.
Keywords: wellbeing economy; G7/G20; economic paradoxes; Wellbeing Economy Alliance (WEAll);
Wellbeing Economy Governments (WEGo)
1. Introduction
Throughout the history of economic thinking, a series of theoretical assumptions have ultimately
been refuted by empirical evidence yet are still the subject of debates. As the global environment,
society, and economy are changing, empirical observations refute what once were economic certainties.
Disproof of mainstream economic assumptions has come from both within and outside the discipline
of economics. Examples are: (1) increased efficiency does not necessarily lead to decreasing use of
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resources (e.g., Jevons paradox), (2) increasing income and wealth does not necessarily lead to higher
levels of wellbeing after a certain threshold is passed (e.g., Easterlin paradox), (3) perpetual economic
growth is neither desirable nor viable (e.g., The Limits to Growth), and (4) in a globalized economy
wealth does not flow from rich to poor nations (e.g., Lucas paradox) (Figure 1). When real world
data and phenomena contradict what is expected by theory we refer to paradoxes; when desirable
outcomes cannot be achieved using policy based on economic theory we refer to delusions. There are
many facts, figures, and situations that demonstrate that the world view of mainstream economics is
flawed. While the discipline of economics is equipped with theory and tools to describe, understand,
and influence socio-ecological systems [1,2], the paradoxes and delusions described here contribute to
a public perception, and a reality, that economic theory is not always coherent with what happens
in the real world. The emergence of paradoxes and delusions may help overcome the rigidity of the
pillars of mainstream economics and, in general, facilitate identification and solution of problems that
are wider than any academic boundary.
This is perhaps best characterized by the famous question from the Queen of England, Elizabeth
II, as to why the economists did not see the 2008 global financial crisis coming. A three-page response
prepared by eminent economists mentions “a failure of the collective imagination of many bright
people” [3], which many might argue is a feeble defense of the scholarly discipline. Other warning
signs as to the credibility of mainstream economic assumptions are also gaining attention. For instance,
wars, illness, and natural disasters increase consumption (of weapons, insurance policies, and building
materials) that in turn push up a nation’s gross domestic product (GDP), which is the primary
indicator of a country’s economic performance [2,4–6]. The idea that the “invisible hand” allocates
resources in a societally optimal way seems to be refuted by the fact that obesity in rich countries and
undernourishment in poor ones are two sides of the same coin (i.e., poverty) [7–9], that half of the
world’s food is thrown away or wasted, that diseases with known cures are still rampant in certain
parts of the world, and that clean energy technologies are still mostly a luxury of the rich [10].
There is growing evidence that economic inequality is not only detrimental to human wellbeing
but is also not efficient even from the traditional economic perspective [11–13]. Economic inequality
is currently extreme and getting worse, with 48% of global wealth distributed to the richest 1% of
the world’s population, 87% to the richest 10%, and 1% to the poorest 50% [14–18] (please refer to
World Inequality Lab [19] for more recent figures on income and wealth inequality). At the same time,
increasing wealth is not automatically solving inequality problems [20].
In this paper, we present in chronological order a selection of paradoxes and delusions (Figure 1)
that question some of the theoretical pillars of mainstream economics. This provides a picture that
will inform the development of a more holistic understanding of economics and stimulate further
discussion among a broad non-technical audience. The idea of a wellbeing economy, originating from
the principles of ecological economics [21], is presented as an alternative way of developing policies
that prioritize a broader conception of wellbeing over a single-minded focus on income growth. We
provide the example of a network of governments for wellbeing (the WEGo network supported by,
but distinct from, the larger Wellbeing Economy Alliance (WEAll)) focusing on economic policies that
overcome mainstream paradoxes and delusions.
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Figure 1. A chronological selection of paradoxes and delusions of the mainstream economics view. 
Global gross domestic product trends are shown in the background. Data from the Maddison Project 
Database [22] (available at: http://rug.nl last accessed: May 2019), and the World Bank Open Data 
(available at: http://data.worldbank.org/ last accessed: April 2017). 
2. The Jevons Paradox and the Dematerialization Delusion 
In 1865, soon after the Industrial Revolution, the economist William Stanley Jevons observed 
that increasing efficiency in coal use did not correspond to a diminished consumption of coal. Instead, 
the contrary was true. Improvements of the steam engine were accelerating the overall consumption 
of coal [23]. This counterintuitive observation is named the Jevons paradox. The dynamics that cause 
Figure 1. A chronological selection of paradoxes and delusions of the mainstream economics view.
Global gross domestic product trends are shown in the background. Data from the Maddison Project
Database [22] (available at: http://rug.nl last accessed: May 2019), and the World Bank Open Data
(available at: http://data.worldbank.org/ last accessed: April 2017).
2. The Jevons Paradox and the Dematerialization Delusion
In 1865, soon after the Industrial Revolution, the economist William Stanley Jevons observed that
increasing efficiency in coal use did not correspond to a diminished consumption of coal. Instead, the
contrary was true. Improvements of the steam engine were accelerating the overall consumption of
coal [23]. This counterintuitive observation is named the Jevons paradox. The dynamics that cause
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a reduction of potential energy savings from improved energy use efficiency are generally called
“rebound effect”; for an overview, see Sorrell [24]. After the first formulation in Jevons’ writings,
rebound effects have both occurred and not occurred in different contexts related to energy use and
use of resources in general [25].
The debate over rebound effects is far from being solved. Nonetheless, mainstream economic
approaches to sustainable development are largely focused on technological improvements in efficiency,
while neglecting the need for policy and tools for widespread reduction of total levels of consumption
and lacking in understanding behavioral change and consumer response. Absolute “decoupling” of
economic production from resource use is seen as a feasible strategy to achieve sustainability. For the
energy sector, decoupling emissions and economic growth is used as an argument that should put to
rest the idea that combating climate change likely requires accepting lower growth or a lower standard
of living [26,27] (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. One example of the Jevons paradox and the dematerialization delusion is CO2 emissions at the
global scale. Despite the fact that CO2 emitted per unit of energy use has diminished from 1960 to 2013
(a), and CO2 emissions per unit of GDP in purchasing power parity have also diminished from 1990 to
2013 (b), total emissions of CO2, and also emissions per capita, increased over the same period (c, d),
just like CO2 concentration in the atmosphere (https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/, accessed
on 3 April 2018). Data from the World Bank Open Data (available at: http://data.worldbank.org/ last
accessed: April 2017).
The general idea of decoupling is associated with improvements in technological efficiency and
a gradual shift to a service economy with associated reductions in the environmental footprint [28].
While this might be achievable at the national scale, the entire global economy cannot become
100% service based [29]. Improving technological efficiency provides important environmental
benefits, but the effects of new technologies on the quality and the overall quantity of resource use
should be fully understood prior to, and throughout, their implementation. Developed economies
are delocalizing environmental impacts, importing goods with high embodied environmental
burden [30,31], outsourcing production, and buying and using foreign land to meet demand for
agricultural products (i.e., the so-called “land-grabbing”) [32–34]. The increased efficiency available
to developed economies as they evolve to become service economies it is not resulting in reduced
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resource consumption overall, but merely relocates or “outsources” resource use and environmental
impacts to other parts of the world. This is pushing the Earth toward its planetary boundaries, affecting
wellbeing of current and future generations [35].
3. The Limits to Growth, Planetary Boundaries, and the Delusion of Infinite Growth
By ignoring physical limits and planetary boundaries, mainstream economists have convinced
politicians and the public that perpetual economic growth is a desirable goal [2,4,36]. They have
developed an influential mythology supporting ideas that economic growth addresses persistent
poverty (“rising tides lift all boats”), improves human wellbeing (growth in GDP/capita determines
increased human wellbeing), creates political and social stability (political stability and economic
growth are mutually reinforcing), and reduces environmental degradation (environmental Kuznets
curve). Belief in this mythology persists despite abundant evidence to the contrary [37–41]. Early
evidence refuting some of this mythology was provided by the Club of Rome’s report: The Limits to
Growth (LtG) [42].
The model developed in LtG, with data available from 1900 to 1970, enabled projections to the
year 2100 for population, food production, industrial production, pollution, and consumption of
non-renewable resources. The fundamental conclusion of LtG was that continued growth in the global
economy would lead to planetary boundaries being exceeded during the 21st century, which would
result in a collapse of both the human population and the economic system. Criticism of LtG was
extensive and almost universal [43,44], creating a narrative suggesting that the model was flawed
and inaccurate. Instead, the projections of LtG have proven to be accurate until the year 2010 [45–47].
Other scientists using alternative perspectives have come to virtually identical conclusions with
respect to the viability of perpetual economic growth [48,49]. While mainstream economics purports
economic growth as an imperative, a wellbeing economy would pursue social foundations of gender
equality, social equity, peace and justice, health, food, water, and education that must be secured within
environmental boundaries [50–52].
4. The Easterlin Paradox and the Delusion That Money Equals Happiness and Wellbeing
In 1974, the economist Richard Easterlin published one of a series of papers on what has become
known as the Easterlin paradox. Easterlin’s research suggests that income levels above a certain
threshold lose their correlation with subjective measures of wellbeing (Figure 3) [37,53]. This implies
that above a certain level of income per capita, basic needs are fulfilled and wellbeing is not improved
at the same rate with higher levels of income [54]. These works suggest that development policies
should give increasing importance to non-economic aspects of life after a certain income level, rather
than focusing almost exclusively on economic growth. The Easterlin paradox thus questions the
supposedly linear link between income and wellbeing and the hypothesis that income is the only
factor in the utility function [55]. This relationship has been explored within and across countries,
in short- and long-term time series, along different political systems, considering multiple possible
variables and mechanisms, and using different multi-dimensional measures of subjective and objective
wellbeing and happiness [10,55–63]. This work clearly shows that human wellbeing (aka “utility”,
happiness, life fulfilment, life satisfaction) does not grow indefinitely as GDP/capita grows and that
promoting the general wellbeing is not simply about raising GDP [64].
The marginal effect of increasing GDP per capita on wellbeing diminishes, and there is no apparent
effect after a certain threshold. This picture is also relevant in the global market, where GDP in some
countries is partially fueled by exporting environmental and social impacts to other countries, thus
ultimately influencing their levels of wellbeing and impacting global environmental quality [33,65,66].
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5. The Lucas Paradox and the Delusion of the Glory of Globalization
In 1990, the economist Robert Lucas observed that capital was not flowing from rich to poor
countries, as predicted by mainstream economics [68] (Figure 4). In truth, capital flows more commonly
from rich to rich countries or even from poor to rich countries. In 2012, developing countries received
$1.3 trillion in investment and aid, while in the same year $3.3 trillion worth of value flowed out
of these developing countries to the developed countries. Since 1980, this has added up to a net
flow of $16.3 trillion from the poor to the rich [69,70]. The Lucas paradox highlights some of the real
implications of modern globalization, refuting the assumption that globalization should be favorable
to poor countries, leading to converging world incomes [71]. This convergence was predicted as a
consequence of increasing direct foreign investments from the rich world, attracted by the low wages
and high returns on capital [72].
The role of institutional quality in explaining international flows of capital have been discussed
by Alfaro et al. [73] and Azémar and Desbordes [74], demonstrating that institutional quality helps
explain the paradox, but does not make it disappear. While institutional quality might be low
in some low-income countries with, for example, high levels of corruption, we might argue that
institutional quality is also pretty low in high income countries sustaining unfair trade regimes,
debt arrangements, and, from a historical perspective, slavery. An extension of the Lucas paradox
has been proposed for the labor market, with skilled labor migration from skill-scarce to skill-rich
countries [72]. Similar paradoxical behaviors are observed for natural capital acquisitions in the global
market, where large-scale purchases of productive land (mainly for agricultural purposes) can be
explained by economic differences between countries, more than by differences in natural capital
availability [32,33,66,75].
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6. The Delusion of the Environmental Kuznets Curve
In the early 1990s a new argument was used to support perpetual economic growth as the means
to eventual environmental improvement. It is that environmental degradation first rises and then falls
as per capita income grows, following an inverted U-shaped pattern (when plotting environmental
degradation on the y-axis and per capita income on the x-axis; Figure 5a). The assumption is that
in the first stage of this pattern, pollution increases rapidly because society is focused on jobs and
income, disregarding environmental quality. At this stage, communities are too poor to pay for
pollution abatement, and environmental regulation is weak. With rising incomes, the industrial sectors
become cleaner, society values environmental quality as more important, and environmental regulatory
institutions become stronger.
Throughout the 1990s and the very early 2000s, several studies supported the existence of the
so-called environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) [76]. At the same time, its generality has been disproved,
showing that early studies describing it only consider some possible measures of environmental
damage, or are based on simplifying assumptions about the economy, e.g., considering that pollution
is generated either by only production or only consumption, making strong assumptions on individual
preferences, and ignoring delocalization of environmental impacts.
The scientific debate on the EKC is still lively and ongoing [77]. However, the most straightforward
critique of the existence of the EKC is that environmental damage is often irreversible [78,79], regardless
of any supposed relationship with income.
For example, if increasing air pollution increases the death toll [80], it is questionable how this
impact would be reversed once high levels of economic growth are reached. Moreover, in some cases
an N-shaped EKC has been recognized [81–84], indicating a further inversion in the profile of the
curve, with environmental degradation restarting to grow beyond certain levels of income (Figure 5b).
When more comprehensive and systemic indicators of human impact on the environment are
considered (e.g., the ecological footprint), it clearly emerges that economic growth is often related with
worsening ecological balance in terms of consumption versus availability of natural resources [49].
The emissions of most pollutants and wastes increase monotonically with income [76]. Emissions
of CO2 increase fast with economic growth and decrease at a slower phase during economic crises,
highlighting a certain degree of inertia that would make the descending part of the EKC more “flat”,
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extending over time the negative effects of growth [85]. At the same time, developing countries
sometimes have more success addressing environmental issues than some wealthy countries [86].
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Inequalities generate multiple relationships of environmental degradation and income per capita
in different countries of the world and within single countries, with the top 10% of global income
earners responsible for 36% of the current carbon footprint of households [87].
7. The S ort-Cir uit of Gr wth, Inequality, and Wellbeing, and the Delusion of the Invisible
Hand
The empirical truth regarding inequality is that it is increasing both within countries and between
countries [19] (Figure 6). Inequality between individuals in the world rose from a Gini of 54.7 in the
19th century, to a Gini of 65 in the 21st century. Furthermore, the composition of global inequality
has drastically changed—inequality was largely driven by within-country inequalities (or “class”
inequality; accounting for 70% of global inequality), while it is now most strikingly driven by differences
in the mean country incomes (or “location/citizenship-based” inequality; accounting for 80% of global
inequality) [16]. This suggests that today, migration is one of the most accessible means to improve
economic welfare.
Sustainability 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 9 of 16 
 
Figure 6. Between-country and global inequality (as measured by the Gini Index) increased during 
the past two centuries together with the world average GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity 
units); after Milanovic [16]. 
8. Discussion 
8.1. An Apostasy from Free-Market Fetishism 
Non-economists as well as economists are seeing glaring problems and inconsistencies with the 
contemporary theory and practice of mainstream economics. Social scientists are recognizing the 
urgent need to confront the planetary environmental crisis [94]. Green criminologists are debating 
how capitalism and nature can both survive over the long run and if, in criminological terms, 
capitalism is a crime against nature [95,96]. 
The academic discipline of economics encompasses profound disagreement and controversy over 
fundamental ideas such as Keynesianism, monetary policy, feminist economics, and the efficiency 
and accuracy of the free market for setting asset prices [97]. Ongoing debates over these ideas prove 
that the discipline of economics is alive, flexible, and potentially responsive. Nobel Prize winning 
economist Paul Krugman has provided an excellent summary of these disagreements, stating that 
“the economics profession went astray because economists … clung to a vision of capitalism as a 
perfect or nearly perfect system, (and) this romanticized and sanitized vision of the economy led 
(them) to ignore all the things that can go wrong.” He thus argues that “(Economists) will have to 
acknowledge the importance of irrational and often unpredictable behavior, face up to the often 
idiosyncratic imperfections of markets” [97].  
This captures some but not all of the problems with the theoretical foundations of the discipline 
of economics. For example, it does not capture the failure of mainstream economics in valuing natural 
capital as the very foundation upon which all market economic activity takes place [98]. It is an 
accessible characterization of the level of disagreement within the discipline.  
It is interesting that while the discipline of economics encompasses fundamental disagreement 
within the academy, mainstream economics is still the most revered approach to economics for 
advising policy makers. This is in contrast to an academic discipline such as climatology, which 
enjoys almost unanimous agreement on fundamental theory within its discipline, yet its practitioners 
are ignored and disparaged even though they have a much better track record in matters of 
predictions and fundamental theoretical explanations. It is time for policy makers to give more 
attention to economic schools and approaches that embrace the messy world of data, empirical 
reality, uncertainty, and irrational human behavior [1,2,99–103]. It is interesting to note that many 
recent Nobel Prizes in economics have been awarded to people who have recognized the implications 
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Figure 6. Between-country and global inequality (as measured by the Gini Index) increased during the
past two centuri s togethe with the world average GDP per capita (in purchasi g power p rity units);
aft r Milanovi [16].
Between 2009 and 2013 two books related to inequality were published: “The Spirit Level: Why
More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better” by the epidemiologists Richard G. Wilkinson and Kate
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Pickett [11] and “Capital in the Twenty-First Century” by the economist Thomas Piketty [38]. Referring
to a vast amount of social and medical science literature and performing new analyses, Wilkinson
and Pickett demonstrated strong relationships between increasing income inequality and worsening
wellbeing in a long list of social indicators including social capital (i.e., how much people trust each
other and engage in social or civic participation), happiness, stress and anxiety, life expectancy, mental
illness and obesity, infant mortality, violent crime rates, social mobility, and education scores, among
others [11] (for a full and updated list of references on this visit: https://www.equalitytrust.org.uk).
Piketty’s work highlighted how increasing economic inequality is a natural characteristic of economic
systems focused on “growth at all cost”, as the increase in inequality only halted or inverted during
shocking socio-economic events, such as the two World Wars [38]. Collectively, these works raise serious
questions regarding the role of inequality and numerous long-held mainstream economic assumptions.
The causal links among economic dynamics, inequality, and wellbeing still need to be
thoroughly investigated [39,88–91], and more importantly, the generality of these links need to
be fully demonstrated.
The works of Piketty, Wilkinson and Pickett are a significant addition to the long list of critics
and refutations of the theoretical predictions envisioned by mainstream economists over the course of
history. It is necessary and possible to move away from economic growth at all costs and develop a
framework of policy reforms for achieving wellbeing economies at the national and global level [92,93].
8. Discussion
8.1. An Apostasy from Free-Market Fetishism
Non-economists as well as economists are seeing glaring problems and inconsistencies with the
contemporary theory and practice of mainstream economics. Social scientists are recognizing the
urgent need to confront the planetary environmental crisis [94]. Green criminologists are debating how
capitalism and nature can both survive over the long run and if, in criminological terms, capitalism is a
crime against nature [95,96].
The academic discipline of economics encompasses profound disagreement and controversy over
fundamental ideas such as Keynesianism, monetary policy, feminist economics, and the efficiency and
accuracy of the free market for setting asset prices [97]. Ongoing debates over these ideas prove that the
discipline of economics is alive, flexible, and potentially responsive. Nobel Prize winning economist
Paul Krugman has provided an excellent summary of these disagreements, stating that “the economics
profession went astray because economists . . . clung to a vision of capitalism as a perfect or nearly
perfect system, (and) this romanticized and sanitized vision of the economy led (them) to ignore all the
things that can go wrong.” He thus argues that “(Economists) will have to acknowledge the importance
of irrational and often unpredictable behavior, face up to the often idiosyncratic imperfections of
markets” [97].
This captures some but not all of the problems with the theoretical foundations of the discipline of
economics. For example, it does not capture the failure of mainstream economics in valuing natural
capital as the very foundation upon which all market economic activity takes place [98]. It is an
accessible characterization of the level of disagreement within the discipline.
It is interesting that while the discipline of economics encompasses fundamental disagreement
within the academy, mainstream economics is still the most revered approach to economics for advising
policy makers. This is in contrast to an academic discipline such as climatology, which enjoys almost
unanimous agreement on fundamental theory within its discipline, yet its practitioners are ignored
and disparaged even though they have a much better track record in matters of predictions and
fundamental theoretical explanations. It is time for policy makers to give more attention to economic
schools and approaches that embrace the messy world of data, empirical reality, uncertainty, and
irrational human behavior [1,2,99–103]. It is interesting to note that many recent Nobel Prizes in
economics have been awarded to people who have recognized the implications of many of the failed
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assumptions of mainstream economics. We argue that a fundamental set of premises from ecological
economics [21,104] can serve as guidelines for redirecting economic policy advising with the aim of
transitioning towards sustainable wellbeing economic systems.
8.2. A Modest Proposal to Reform the Logic of Economics
The paradoxes and delusions described in this paper are well known. The Jevons paradox, the
LtG, and the non-generality of the EKC remind us that the effects of technological improvement and
development at the global scale can be different from those effects at local scales. The Easterlin paradox
reminds us that income is only one of many contributors to human wellbeing. The Lucas paradox
and the delusion of the invisible hand show how free global trade can contribute to maintain global
imbalances. Taken together in one overall picture, these paradoxes and delusions alert us to the
negative outcomes of economic “growth at all costs”, with local and global consequences. They show
us that economic growth is not synonymous with increasing wellbeing and prosperity and that the
logic of economics needs fundamental transformation, shifting away from a narrow focus on producing
and consuming marketed goods and services to one more broadly focused on sustainable wellbeing as
the goal of development [105].
A wellbeing economy has the fundamental goal of delivering good human mental and physical
health, greater equality and fairness, good social relationships, and a flourishing natural environment.
A wellbeing economy will attribute value to economic activities driven by collaboration and sharing,
recycling, and upcycling. It will redefine the role of producers and consumers, blurring the boundaries
between them. It will entail regenerated ecosystems and an extended global commons. It will mitigate
the need for vast expenditure on treating, healing, and fixing through supporting safe and healthy
communities and distributing wealth more fairly from the outset (predistribution) rather than relying
on complex and politically fragile (in times of inequality) redistribution. It will switch to renewables
and purpose-driven businesses with social and environmental aims. It will focus on measures of
progress that reflect real value creation [106].
Existing examples of what a wellbeing economy might look like are already happening around
the world through innovative business models based on restorative and regenerative design, service
offerings, collaborative consumption, and re-use and re-cycling. A transition to renewable energy is
already happening, with countries such as Costa Rica, Finland, and Sweden aiming at being carbon
neutral by 2021, 2035, and 2045, respectively, and national trusts, institutions, and companies divesting
from fossil fuels.
Local and national governments are implementing measures of prosperity to inform budgetary
decisions beyond their effect on economic growth. In 2019, New Zealand adopted such a Wellbeing
Budget [107]. Similarly, Scotland assesses national progress through a framework measuring outcomes
in improving child wellbeing, sense of community, culture and education, environmental quality,
quality of working conditions, health, human rights, and reducing poverty. The framework includes
economic growth as one of the many deliverables of a national economy, assessing it, however, against
carbon footprint and natural capital depletion [108].
A wellbeing economy has a commitment to put wellbeing at the heart of policymaking. Overall,
to implement a wellbeing economy, we need a major transformation to:
(1) Live within planetary boundaries and achieve environmental sustainability;
(2) Achieve and maintain an equitable distribution of wealth and opportunity, both within and
between generations;
(3) Efficiently allocate resources to provide high levels of human wellbeing.
A fair, responsive, just, and accountable governance system aimed at promoting wellbeing
recognizes the interconnectedness of the environment, society, and the economy and is coherent with
global initiatives for sustainability, such as the Sustainable Development Goals [92]. The paradoxes
and delusions discussed here evidence how mainstream economics theory does not reflect anymore
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the current real-world phenomena. Failing to live within planetary boundaries makes it impossible to
achieve an equitable distribution to future generations. The findings of Piketty and Wilkinson and
Pickett suggest that this will in turn undermine the end goals of human and ecological wellbeing.
Krugman’s prescription for a re-evaluation of the discipline of economics does not go far enough in
dealing with planetary boundaries and natural capital within the global economy. Efficient allocation
is essentially what mainstream economics has attempted to do historically within its flawed terms
of reference (e.g., failing to value natural capital and waiving concerns about distribution of wealth).
Imposing Pareto optimality and ceteris paribus rules suggest that equitable distribution will also
represent a formidable challenge for any serious attempt to re-evaluate and/or reform the discipline
of economics. Just like environmental economics that developed in its present form in the 1960s
from acknowledging market failures, now it is time to transform the economic discipline into a more
integrative and branched theoretical apparatus not only focused on the maximization of profits and
equalization of marginal costs and revenues (that only reflect marketable items). In the spirit of using
empirical and adaptive approaches to achieving these goals, we suggest some possible solutions and a
new vision of global leadership.
8.3. Reforming Global Economy’s Leadership
The G7 is a group of GDP-rich countries meeting yearly to define common policies “on global
issues like economic growth and crisis management, global security, energy, and terrorism” [109].
Despite the fact that no formal membership criteria exist, all the participant countries were initially
selected on the basis of their GDP, a parameter which is also used to identify members of the G20 [2,109].
One question to ask is: Are the goals and objectives of the G7 appropriately framed in light of climate
change, economic inequality, security, and resource depletion? If the answer is “no” and we reframe
the purpose of the G7 towards sustainability, equity, and efficiency then we might ask: Are the current
countries that comprise the G7 the best examples of political economies that actually function to
increasing the common good in a sustainable way? Or, in other words, do we have a good set of
exemplars steering the global economy?
None of the G7 countries are amongst the seven best-performing countries for sustainable
development (according to the Ecological Footprint, the Happy Planet Index, and the Human
Development Index), nor in terms of wellbeing (according to Foundations of Wellbeing and the Social
Progress Index), nor in terms of environmental performance (with the exception of Germany, according
to the Yale Environmental Performance Index), nor prosperity (with the exception of Canada, according
to the Legatum Prosperity Index) [110]. The list of best-performing countries according to these
alternative-to-GDP indicators includes countries whose sustainability vision and inclusive policies
have been praised by eminent economists [111].
National governments that are prioritizing environmental, social, and economic policies for
increasing wellbeing should step forward as global leaders. This is already happening through the
Wellbeing Economy Governments partnership (WEGo), a joint initiative that was officially launched
in November 2018 led by Scotland with New Zealand and Iceland, with further governments to
join in the coming months and years. The formation of WEGo was discussed in October 2017 in
Glasgow by representatives of governments, including ministers and high-ranking officials and with
the advice of world-leading academics and the OECD. This instigation of WEGo [112] recognizes
the importance of economies that contribute to the wellbeing of people and planet and that through
collaboration and sharing of good practice, countries can better deliver this goal. Participating
governments and economies have demonstrated capacity to marry a low-impact economy with high
living standards or are sincerely committed to it in future policy decisions. This implies going beyond
GDP as the key parameter to identify international leadership and implicitly recognizes mainstream
economics paradoxes and delusions that constrain the development of a wellbeing economy. Forming
an international alliance provides a significant opportunity for this initial group of countries to act as
the drivers of change by championing wellbeing principles and collaborating together. They show
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that the shift to a new economic and social paradigm that puts people and the planet at its core is a
development goal more suited for the 21st century than clinging on to the economics of paradoxes and
delusions. This is also consilient with the vision of UNEP’s recently published Global Environmental
Outlook (GEO-6) with its vision of “Healthy People, Healthy Planet” [113].
Alongside WEGo is a cross-sectoral collaboration of networks, businesses, academics, citizens, and
civil society—this is the Wellbeing Economy Alliance [114]. Its members are united by the willingness
to work together to build an economy that serves people and planet first and foremost.
9. Conclusions
Mainstream economic theory is characterized and burdened by a series of paradoxes and delusions
to such an extent that it does not apply to real-world phenomena. Several economic conundrums
overlook fundamental and established principles of physics, ecology, and thermodynamics while
supporting the current inequitable distribution of power and wealth. We need to overcome our global
addiction to GDP growth and disabuse ourselves of faith in economics mythology. This can be done
through thinking about the consequences of perpetual economic growth in light of our collective values
and goals as humanity.
Policy making cannot be solely informed by an elite of economists perpetuating a flawed vision
of the world. National and global policies need to recognize environmental limits and take social
responsibility. At the local, regional, and global levels, economic leadership needs to be changed. This
is already happening through initiatives for wellbeing such as the Wellbeing Economic Governments
network (WEGo) that aims to share knowledge and inspire other governments to implement successful
policies for wellbeing. From a bottom-up perspective, the Wellbeing Economy Alliance (WEAll) is
bringing together existing networks of citizens, academics, and businesses working together for a
wellbeing economy for the people and the planet.
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